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This is a report written by three academics from the University of
Manchester, the University of Southampton, and the University
of Leeds on behalf of the United Nations Association – UK. These
researchers have conducted a year-long project supported by the
British Academy.1 Drawing extensively from research interviews
with 29 participants2 – UN diplomats, UK officials, and individuals
from non-governmental organisations – they have developed a
picture of the perceptions and reputation of the United Kingdom
within the United Nations system. Their research supports UNA-
UK’s longstanding3 contention that the UK needs to demonstrate
its added value to the United Nations system, and adopt a
principled and values driven foreign policy, if it is to maintain its
current levels of efficacy and impact at the United Nations and
add substance to its self-described ‘Global Britain’ agenda.
Introduction 
3Global Britain in the United Nations
On 23 June 2016 the UK voted
to leave the EU. The referendum
debate mainly focused on issues
of domestic concern, however
the decision necessarily has
ramifications beyond the UK,
and indeed, implications beyond
the EU. It has been described
as “clearly the biggest foreign
policy challenge for the UK for 




Permanent Under Secretary 
of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office,
described it as “the biggest
thing that we have ever
undertaken in peace time”.5
The UK’s decision to leave 
the EU, or ‘Brexit’ as its
colloquially known, impacts
how the UK is perceived by
other states, including its
perceived reliability as a
multilateral partner. 
The influence that states can leverage in
international negotiations is due, in part, to
their reputation. In this report we explore
the impacts of Brexit on the UK’s
reputation and capacity for influence within
the United Nations’ primary interstate
forums: the General Assembly and the
Security Council. The UK’s seat in the UN
Security Council is not under threat, but
there is recognition that its legitimacy has
weakened. Germany, for instance, has
seized on this to reinvigorate its campaign
for an EU seat within the Security Council
by saying it will treat its non-permanent
seat “as a European seat”.6
For any loss of influence that the UK may
experience there are other states looking 
to capitalise on shifting capacity, be it
Ireland looking to position itself as an
English-speaking ‘gateway’ into Europe7, 
or France’s increased leverage as the only
EU member with a permanent seat in the
Security Council. Historically, the UK’s
permanent seat has led it to prioritise the
Security Council over the General
Assembly where it now faces the double
challenge of having focused less in this
area in the past and no longer being able 
to rely on backing from the large EU bloc.
Within the Security Council and the General
Assembly there are challenges to the UK’s
influence and effectiveness as it navigates
its withdrawal from the EU. 
At the time of writing, the UK’s departure
from the EU has not taken place, so we are
assessing changes in the UK’s reputation
as an effect of the 2016 decision to leave
the EU. 
The report is divided into four sections.
First, we consider the UK’s current
practices within both bodies. Second, we
investigate perceptions of the UK’s policy
of ‘Global Britain’ to see what traction it
has gained both from British diplomats and
in New York. Third, we analyse perceptions
of the UK’s reputation in the UN after the
Brexit decision, from both a British and an
international perspective. Fourth, a section
of case studies where the UK has
struggled to achieve its foreign policy
interests after the Brexit decision, on
Somalia, in elections to the International
Court of Justice and in relation to the
Chagos Islands. 
While there are still areas where the 
UK remains influential, our research
highlights considerable challenges for
the UK in maintaining its current level 
of influence once it has exited the EU.
Executive Summary
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where the first ever UN
General Assembly was held.
(UN Photo)
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2. We tried to interview and cite an
equal number of men and women
for this report. Unfortunately, this
was not possible, partly because of
the gender imbalance in the
community we were investigating
and additionally because the women
we interviewed chose to be
anonymous, as did 12 of the men (all
interviewees were given the option
of anonymity). As a consequence, all
the interviewees we have cited by
name in this report are male – a
shortcoming in the data that should
be given due consideration. 
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• Specific policy ideas and resources from
London, demonstrating the value of the
United Kingdom in international forums.
One such opportunity is presented by
Secretary General António Guterres’ call
for a “quantum leap in collective action”
on peace operations,8 including
leadership in New York on the
implementation of protection of civilian
mandates. This could also provide one
means of following through on Foreign
Secretary Jeremy Hunt’s commitment to
”do more within our budget on atrocity
prevention”.9
• Addressing gaps in diplomatic capacity
at the General Assembly, which will
develop as the UK is no longer able to
rely on EU for burden sharing and
support. 
• Maintaining resolutely the UK’s 0.7%
commitment to foreign aid – a major
source of soft power and influence.
• Developing a more refined
communications strategy, including 
by dropping references to joining other
groupings such as Canada, Australia and
New Zealand (known as CANZ), which
our data suggests would not be viable. 
• Defending the legitimacy of UK
leadership within the UN would provide
for a more effective approach than
maintaining the narrative of ‘Global
Britain’. This can be achieved by
continuing to develop a more inclusive
and collaborative approach to the
practice of ‘penholding’ at the UN
Security Council, including co-
penholding with elected members, in
ways that address the exclusionary
effects of the practice. This is
particularly important when emerging
powers with resources to implement
UK-negotiated mandates are elected to
the Council. It is significant in this
respect that Germany takes up an
elected seat on the Council in 2019.
Below: Prime Minister Clement
Attlee addresses the first
session of the UN General
Assembly in London in 1946.
(UN Photo/Marcel Blolomey)
8. Secretary General António
Guterres, 8218th meeting of the UN
Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.
8218, 28 March 18; Brian Urquhart,
Action for Peacekeeping. Will
Political Consensus Lead to a
Change in Practice? International





“While there are still areas where the UK remains influential, 
our research highlights considerable challenges for the UK in
maintaining its current level of influence as it exits the EU.”
To mitigate these risks
we recommend:
The UK in the UN
Security Council
The UK is viewed as an activist state in the
Security Council. It takes a strong role in
drafting resolutions and agenda-setting and
is generally seen as a skilled negotiator. 
‘Penholding’ is an informal process whereby
a state takes political ownership for leading
drafts on a specific topic and since 2008 it
has become more structured.10 Penholding
is a key indicator of influence, and between
them, the UK, the US, and France (the
“P3”) now dominate penholding in the UN
Security Council. 
A diplomat who represented their country
on the Security Council twice some years
apart remarked that “I was surprised
when I came back that all the pens were
with the P3”.11 Indeed, of 36 agenda
items with penholders in 2018 permanent
five (P5) members ‘held the pen’ for 28
items. The UK is penholder for 12 agenda
items – a full third of the total – mostly on
its own and a few in collaboration with
other members.12 The items that the UK
is penholder for include specific high-
profile conflicts such as those in Yemen
and Myanmar, as well as prominent
thematic areas such as peacekeeping, the
protection of civilians in armed conflict,
and Women, Peace and Security. 
This gives the UK considerable influence
over whether and when to create a draft
resolution, how to interpret a situation,
and what measures or initiatives to
propose. To some extent the P3 take on
these roles because they have the
diplomatic capacity – both in New York
and at home – to act across a broad range
of issue areas. It does, however,
contribute towards a situation where the
P3 are perceived as having
disproportionate control over Security
Council negotiations. There is a legitimacy
cost for the P3 if they are seen as
marginalising elected members. 
The UK – again along with the US and
France – generally dominates the agenda-
setting process in the Security Council.
Formally adding a new item to the
Security Council’s agenda for the first time
is a procedural decision on which the veto
can not be used. Without the veto, China
and Russia were unable to block new
agenda items on Zimbabwe, Myanmar and
North Korea, nor were they able to
generate enough opposition to block the
decision in a simple majority vote. The UK
is generally proactive on agenda-setting,
although the UK and the US initially
resisted adding Darfur to the agenda due
to the concurrent conflict between
Khartoum and the south of Sudan (now
South Sudan).13
The UK at the UN
Below: UK Permanent
Representative to the UN Karen
Pierce chairing a Security
Council meeting in 2018. (UN
Photo/Manuel Elias)
10. On penholding see; Ralph, J. and
Gifkins, J. (2017) 'The purpose of
United Nations Security Council
practice: Contesting competence
claims in the normative context
created by the Responsibility to
Protect', European Journal of
International Relations, 23(3), pp.
630-653; and Schia, N. N. (2017)
'Horseshoe and Catwalk: Power,
Complexity, and Consensus-Making
in the United Nations Security
Council', in Niezen, R. & Sapignoli,
M. (eds.) Palaces of Hope: The
Anthropology of Global
Organizations. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; and
Gifkins, J. (2017) 'The Exclusionary





11. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#13. Conducted in New York, 27
July.








13. Gifkins, J. (2016) 'Darfur', in
Bellamy, A.J. & Dunne, T. (eds.)
Oxford Handbook of the
Responsibility to Protect: Oxford
University Press.
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If the UK is able to maintain its political
capital it will still be able to have a
dominant position in relation to setting the
Security Council’s agenda. 
The UK is generally viewed as a competent
negotiator in the UN Security Council.
Within the UN, the UK Permanent Mission
is recognised “for its superior skills in the
many legal technicalities that often bog
down the Council”. 14 UN diplomats we
interviewed from outside the UK generally
– although not exclusively – gave
favourable reflections on their experiences
of working with the British permanent
mission during negotiations. For example,
an interviewee from a non-EU country
stated that “the UK even inside the
Security Council is one of the most fair
players. I do not recall anytime where they
come to the table put out the document
and say ‘take it or leave it‘, no. They always
give you enough time. Always engage in
good faith in negotiations with you”. 15
Another non-EU interviewee from a
Security Council member state described
the UK as ‘very good’ in the way they
conduct negotiations. They are “mostly, 
not always... very good, they try to build
consensus, they have been very good with
us on this, outside the Council and inside
the Council”.16 An EU interviewee spoke
more critically of the UK’s drafting
practices, describing an example where the
UK circulated a draft after 6pm and
expected states to be ready to negotiate
the draft at 10am the following morning,
with little time to speak with their foreign
ministries.17 
The more common reflections on British
diplomacy though were that of skill,
inclusion and of personalities who were well
liked by fellow diplomats. Traditionally the
UK permanent mission in New York is given
some flexibility from Whitehall, however if
the UK were to align itself more closely with
the US after Brexit that could limit the UK’s
capacity for manoeuvre in the UN.
The UK then is currently viewed as a state
with a high level of diplomatic skill within
the Security Council. Diplomatic skill is not
static, however. It relies on continued
financial investment in diplomacy, as well
as broader political investments in the
reputation of the UK. A challenge for the
UK in the Security Council is defending the
legitimacy of its position as a permanent
member. The UK and France – aware of
their changing status as global military and
economic power shifts – refrain from using
their veto powers although the existence
of the veto still shapes the dynamics within
negotiations. The last time that either state
formally cast a veto vote was in 1989. 
There are specific proposals encouraging
permanent members to formally commit to
not using their veto in situations of mass
atrocity crimes. The two main proposals on
veto restraint are from the Accountability,
Transparency and Coherence (ACT) group,
and one led by France. The UK has
expressed support for both proposals,
however it was at the initiative of the UK
that a caveat was inserted into the ACT
proposal that the Security Council draft in
question must be ‘credible’ which is a
highly subjective term.18
Despite these debates around the use and
legitimacy of the veto, the UK’s position as
a permanent member of the Security
Council is not under threat – particularly
because the British government would
need to ratify any amendment to the UN
Charter which gives the UK a veto over its
own removal.19
Questions are increasingly being asked,
however, about the legitimacy of the UK’s
position as a permanent member.20 In
interviews, questions were often raised by
interviewees (unprompted) regarding the
appropriateness of the UK’s permanent
position on the Security Council in light of
Brexit and the UK’s diminished status since
1945.21 After Brexit, if the UK has less
capacity to lead, draft, and negotiate key
decisions on international threats then the
legitimacy of its permanent seat will come
under more intense scrutiny. 
The Brexit negotiations themselves place
the UK delegation in a difficult position as it
needs to be on good terms with EU states
and other economically powerful states with
whom it will want to negotiate trade deals.
An interviewee from a P5 state said that the
UK was currently less willing to criticise EU
states because they are prioritising the
Brexit negotiations, and that “all interactions
[with the UK] are seen through a Brexit
lens”. 22 Similarly, a non-EU interviewee
explained that the UK was less willing to
criticise China now, in recognition of how
important China will be to the UK after
Brexit.23 These problems for the UK are self-
reinforcing because if they tread more
gingerly they appear to other members as if
they are less powerful and less able to take
a leadership role. This poses risks for the UK
as they attempt to navigate their position in
the world post-Brexit. 
14. Adler-Nissen, R. and Pouliot, V.
(2014) 'Power in practice:
Negotiating the international
intervention in Libya', European
Journal of International Relations,
20(4), p 898. 
15. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#16. Conducted in New York, 4
August.
16. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#18. Conducted in New York, 5
September.
17. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#19. Conducted in New York 7
September.
18. Security Council Report (2015)





19. United Nations 1945. Charter of
the United Nations. United Nations,
Article 108. 
20. Gifkins, J., Ralph, J. and Jarvis,
S. (2018) 'Diplomats Reveal
Concerns Over UK's Waning







21. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#17. Conducted in New York, 4
September; Author Interview 2018.
Interview #14. Conducted in New
York, 27 July; and Author Interview
2018. Interview #15. Conducted in
London, 23 August; Author Interview
2018. Interview #18. Conducted in
New York, 5 September. 
22. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#24. Conducted in New York, 12
December.
23. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#25. Conducted in New York, 12
December.
The UK in the UN 
General Assembly
The membership and voting structure of
the General Assembly – where each of 193
states has one vote without vetoes –
means that negotiations are of a different
nature to those in the Security Council. In
contrast to the Security Council, influence
in the UN General Assembly relies more on
numbers, which means that groups carry
more weight in negotiations than individual
states, meaning that Brexit poses a greater
challenge for the UK in the General
Assembly. There is also a perception that
the UK’s permanent seat on the Security
Council has led to a long-standing choice to
prioritise the Council to the detriment of its
engagement with the General Assembly. 
At one of the Foreign Affairs Select
Committee hearings, for instance, Lord
David Owen said “I think we have very
little influence on the General Assembly.
Knowing how to handle the General
Assembly is a skill. We have focused on
handling the Security Council, which we
have been very good at over the years, and
we have disparaged the General
Assembly.”24 Others echoed this
sentiment that the UK has not invested
enough in the General Assembly25 and that
the level of diplomatic skill it has in General
Assembly negotiations it not as high as in
the Security Council.26 All of this means
that there are some real risks for the UK in
the General Assembly. Post-Brexit it will no
longer be able to rely on support from
other EU members and – having prioritised
the Security Council – it has a relatively
weaker diplomatic skill-set to fall back on
without this bloc support. 
Interviewees – both from the UK and
abroad – saw a strong link between the
UK’s reputation within the General
Assembly and its commitment to providing
0.7% of gross national income (GNI) in
foreign aid. It was stressed that for many
states development is their top priority
within the UN.27 In 2018 the UK was one 
of only 6 states which meets the target
commitment of 0.7% of GNI in official
development assistance.28 Former UK
Ambassador to the UN, Sir Mark Lyall
Grant, described how crucial the foreign aid
commitment is for the UK to demonstrate
“evidence of real intent to be a global
power”, 29 and former UK Ambassador to
the UN Lord Hannay concurred that
without this continued commitment the
UK’s reputation “would be in sort of free
fall territory”. 30
Below: Theresa May addresses
the UN General Assembly,
September 2018. – (UN
Photo/Cia Pak)
24. ‘Foreign Affairs Committee
(2018) 'Oral Evidence: Global Britain',







25. Gowan, R. (2018) Separation
Anxiety: European Influence at the
UN after Brexit: European Council on




26. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#8. Conducted in New York, 25 July.
27. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#5. Conducted in London, 18 June.
28. McBride, J. (2018)
'Backgrounder: How Does the US
Spend its Foreign Aid? ', Available:




29. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#5. Conducted in London, 18 June.
30. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#2. Conducted in London, 24 May.




Whilst the phrase Global
Britain has a range of
historical connotations31 it
has been taken on by the





rhetorical references to the
phrase, there is still no
clarity on what Global
Britain might mean, even from a
UK perspective. 
This has a knock-on effect, making it more
difficult for the UK to project clarity of
purpose abroad. Whilst the UK
Government has stated that “Global
Britain is already backed by substance” –
including a recently announced ‘Global
Britain Board’32 – and thus demonstrates
that the UK is “increasingly open,
outward-looking and confident on the
world stage”, our research suggests that
this perception is not shared by
stakeholders and diplomatic partners.33
One of the main areas of concern is how
the policy of Global Britain fits into
existing strategies and frameworks. We
interviewed a range of UK officials –
including three who have served as British
Ambassador to the United Nations – and
asked about their perceptions of Global
Britain. Interviewees expressed concern
at the government's lack of strategic
thinking on the position of UK foreign
policy after Brexit. 
The more positive assessments regarding
the Global Britain phrase emphasised
opportunities for the UK to “do more and
to be more engaged with the UN than we
are currently”; there is little evidence of
this as yet, it is “a work in progress”. 34
Former European Commissioner Baroness
Ashton described Global Britain as an
“aspiration” stating that “it was a way of
saying, both domestically and
internationally, that Britain was still going
to be an outward-facing nation”. 35
However, when discussing the potential
for the UK to carve out a new foreign
policy approach to alliance building at the
UN, many interviewees were sceptical of
the extra benefits the UK could gain
outside of the EU. As Sir Simon Fraser,
former Permanent Undersecretary at the
FCO, explained in an interview, “we’re
going to end up wanting to be pretty much
where we are now on international affairs:
an active influential voice”. 36
As a result, the UK needs to consider in
greater detail the purpose and direct policy
implications of a new ‘Global Britain’
strategy, particularly in terms of how this
might differ from its current foreign policy
strategy as a member of the EU. This
requires a more honest discussion
regarding whether Global Britain is simply
a rebranding exercise or the starting point
for policy conversations that will seek to
redefine UK foreign policy according to




showcase the “Global Britain”
traffic light scorecard at a UNA-
UK conference in 2018. (UNA-
UK/Alfie Jenkins)
31. Hill, Christopher. 2018. 'Turning
Back the Clock: The Illusion of a
Global Political Role for Britain'. In
Brexit and Beyond: Rethinking the
Futures of Europe, eds. Benjamin
Martill and Uta Staiger. London: UCL
Press.
32. UK Government. 2018. National
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36. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#3. Conducted via Telephone, 4 June.
“Despite significant rhetorical references to the phrase,
there is still no clarity on what Global Britain might
mean, even from a UK perspective.”
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External perceptions 
of Global Britain
At the United Nations, diplomats from
outside the UK were in agreement that the
policy of ‘Global Britain’ was not of much
relevance or was simply not discussed.37
As one interviewee highlighted, “Other
countries don’t really talk about it much;
they are more interested in what is the
British policy on Africa or what is the British
policy on the Middle East”. 38
Consequently, it was often characterised
by diplomats as simply a slogan with very
little behind it and was therefore “much
more about the UK domestic audience”. 39
A non-EU diplomat also noted that the UK
mission in New York had not been using
the phrase in its statements, this was
connected to what many saw as the
“ambiguous character of the phrase”. 40
Indeed, Prime Minister Theresa May’s
2018 speech to the UN General Assembly
did not include the phrase ‘Global Britain’.41
The scepticism around the phrase was also
linked back to the perceived motivations
underpinning the Brexit vote, which many
saw as being in opposition to the idea of a
‘Global Britain’ and against certain aspects
of globalization.42
What these responses underline is the
challenge for UK diplomats at the UN to
both effectively interpret the phrase and
use it to then frame new foreign policy
objectives and strategies within the UN.
This new strategy would need to come
from the Foreign Office, particularly
regarding important and difficult issues
such as the instability in Somalia. 
Consequently, if the UK government is
seeking to promote ‘Global Britain’ on the
international stage, evidence so far
suggests it has struggled to convince
external actors of either its purpose and
meaning or its impact on directing UK
foreign policy. As a result, the Foreign Office
will need to consider the value of the ‘Global
Britain’ phrase in more detail, beyond its
rhetorical use to a domestic audience.
Below: The permanent
representatives from the
United Kingdom and United
States, Karen Pierce and Niki
Haley, converse at a Security
Council meeting in 2018. (UN
Photo/Eskinder Debebe)
37. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#13. Conducted in New York, 27 July.
38. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#10. Conducted in New York, 26 July.
39. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#8. Conducted in New York, 25 July. 
40. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#16. Conducted in New York, 4
August.
41. May, T. (2018) 'PM Speech to the
UN General Assembly: 26




42. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#11. Conducted in New York, 26 July.
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British perceptions 
of the UK’s reputation
post-Brexit
Perceptions from the British elite on the
impact of Brexit on the UK’s reputation in
the UN are bleak. An anonymous
interviewee described perceptions of the
UK currently as “we’ve lost our marbles”43
and Former UK Ambassador to the UN Sir
Jeremy Greenstock reported that “most
other people – almost without exception –
think we’ve shot ourselves in the foot”.44
Brexit was viewed by interviewees as
situated within broader global shifts:
“internationally it was seen as a huge
knock to our reputation. It was seen… 
[as like] the US electing Trump: anti-trade,
anti-multilateralism, anti-values, anti-
immigration.”45
There was a common narrative from
British interviewees on the negative
impacts of Brexit on the reputation of the
UK in international politics. In terms of
more specific and tangible impacts of
these reputational costs, diminished British
activism was described: “there is also a
perception that the UK is doing less and
championing fewer, and less difficult
agendas. Most of the difficult diplomacy in
2018 on Syria and Yemen at the UN
Security Council was handled by Sweden
and the Netherlands.”46 Sir Simon Fraser
concurred that “fundamentally and
structurally I think our position, and our
leverage in international institutions, will be
weaker once we have left the European
Union”.47
While interviewees were careful not to
attribute all of the UK’s decline in the UN 
to Brexit they were clear that Brexit
represented a negative impact to the UK’s
reputation and would decrease the UK’s
capacity for influence in the UN. Many
interviewees – both from the UK and
abroad – framed Brexit part of a broader
and more long-standing decline in British
influence internationally.48 As such while
there are concerns about the UK’s role
internationally after Brexit these also need
to be viewed in relation to broader
international power shifts. 
Foreign perceptions 
of the UK’s reputation
post-Brexit
As has been aptly pointed out however, 
“it is not for the UK and its own
Government to say how it is regarded at
the United Nations. It is about how other
people regard us at the United Nations.
That is what counts.”49 To better
understand how the UK is perceived within
the UN after Brexit we interviewed current
diplomats from a range of UN member
states both inside and outside the EU.50
An interviewee from an EU member state
described Brexit as “a historic mistake”
and said that the UK’s “reputation as a
competent and effective international actor
has been weakened”.51
When asked whether Brexit had already
impacted the UK’s capacity for influence an
interviewee from a non-EU state said “Yes,
I can feel the UK’s weight in the Council is
dwindling, you can feel it. Definitely when
Brexit happens things will change.”52 And
an EU source at the UN described that
“one of the risky things about Brexit is the
inconsistency of the mood and you know
to be effective in the Security Council is
this sort of mixture of being confident,
consistent, reliable”.53
These comments indicate the risk for the
UK that it can be viewed as a weakened
actor, which in turn effects its capacity to
set the agenda and lead coalitions that can
deliver UN mandates. That compounds
longstanding doubts about its status as a
permanent member of the Council. 
The impact of Brexit
43. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#15. Conducted in London, 23
August.
44. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#6. Conducted in London, 18 June.
45. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#17. Conducted in New York, 4
September.
46. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#1. Questions answered via email,
31 August.
47. Foreign Affairs Committee (2018)
Oral Evidence: Global Britain. House
of Commons.
48. For example, Author Interview
2018. Interview #22. Conducted in
New York, 11 December; and Author
Interview 2018. Interview #15.
Conducted in London, 23 August. 
49. Foreign Affairs Committee (2017)
Oral Evidence: The UK's Influence in
the UN.
50. We have approached all UN
member states that have served on
the UN Security Council since the
Brexit referendum (2016-2018),
which was a total of 25 states. Not
all states were willing to participate
in this research. 
51. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#11. Conducted in New York, 26 July.
52. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#18. Conducted in New York, 5
September.
53. Author Interview 2018. Interview
#10. Conducted in New York, 26 July.
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Somalia 
The UK has played a highly influential role in the coordination of the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since its creation in 2007. As a UN Security Council
and EU member it was able to successfully leverage pooled EU resources to
strengthen AMISOM’s military capacity in the region. This has been supported by the
UK’s significant diplomatic skill, which effectively aligned EU policy to its own national
foreign policy preferences.55 As one interviewee explained, “the UK had an agenda of
promoting support to Somalia and they promoted that in the UN and they made the
EU pay for it.”56
The UK’s decision to leave the EU therefore has significant implications for the
AMISOM mission, due to its heavy reliance on EU funding.57 In fact, the EU decided
to cap its funding for AMISOM, over UK objections, in January 2016, illustrating the
limits of the UK’s influence even before the referendum result. Interviews with some
EU member states, moreover, reveal a growing concern that Brexit will accelerate an
EU move towards greater focus on the Sahel region, exacerbating P3 disagreement
about how to address insecurity in Somalia.58 The decision to leave the EU is seen as
a significant factor in the difficulties the UK has faced in trying to secure further
financial support to the AMISOM mission.59 In contrast, France has been extremely
effective at mobilising resources for Sahel states, successfully garnering the support
of Germany along with the initially reluctant US, following six months of intense
negotiations.60
The case illustrates how UK diplomacy will require considerable extra financial
resources to compensate for further diversion of EU resources away from the
mandates it manages to negotiate at the UN. Prime Minister May demonstrated UK
leadership in this area by making her first visit to sub-Saharan Africa in August 2018,
and announcing an extra £7 million of new UK funding to support the AU
peacekeeping mission in Somalia.61 Despite this new investment, the mission will
likely require considerable further resources over a sustained period to ensure a
successful handover to Somali forces. This was certainly a factor in the Security
Council’s decision in July 2018 to delay the proposed AU troop reduction until
February, along with changing the handover date to December 2021.62
The Somalia case clearly demonstrates the challenges the UK faces to meet its
responsibilities as a permanent Security Council, which means mobilising resources
that can deliver the mandates its diplomats negotiate. Without that, the efforts of
diplomats will not deliver sustainable solutions to security problems, and that will lead
to further questions about the UK’s role on the Council.
Case studies
The following section gives examples of
situations where the UK has found it difficult
to achieve its goals within the United
Nations system since the Brexit
referendum. Funding for African Union
peacekeeping in Somalia, a vote against the
UK in the General Assembly on the Chagos
Islands, and the failed re-election of a British
judge to the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) illustrate how the UK has found it
difficult to secure its interests and fulfil its
commitment to an active international role. 
The Chagos Islands vote and the ICJ
elections were described by Lord Hannay
as “straws in the wind”. He continued:
“they show which way the wind is
blowing, in my estimation. I don’t think it is
going to stop blowing in that direction any
time soon, and I think they demonstrate
that our ability to fend for ourselves in the
much more exposed position we are in
now is not as great as we would perhaps
wish it to be.”54 While these early
indicators cannot tell us what the UK’s
position will be after Brexit, they do
indicate that the UK has been distracted 
by the referendum result and can be
interpreted as early signs of decreased
influence. 
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The Chagos Islands
Following a long-running legal dispute between the UK and Mauritius over the
Chagos Islands, the UK lost a UN General Assembly vote by 94 votes to 15 in
June 2017. The resolution requested that the ICJ render an advisory opinion on
the legal consequences of the UK’s decision to separate the Chagos Archipelago
from Mauritius before Mauritius gained independence in 1968. The Mauritian
government challenged the actions of the UK as a breach of UN General 
Assembly resolution 1514. The UK territory is currently home to the US military
base, Diego Garcia, which has provided a central justification for the UK’s
argument against ceding the territory back to Mauritius, due to its significant
strategic and defence purposes. The British government has promised that the
territory will be returned when it no longer serves this purpose but has refused 
to provide a date or time scale. 
What was most notable about the voting outcome for the UK was its failure to 
gain the support of EU member states, of which only four chose to support the UK, 
with the majority of EU members abstaining from the vote instead. Furthermore,
the US was the only permanent Security Council member willing to vote with the
UK. The Chagos Island case can also be framed in terms of UK subservience to the
US on security issues, where there is a pattern of the UK following the US lead on
some foreign policies. This can often bring significant reputational damage which
has increased given the current ‘America First’ policy being put forward by the
Trump administration. Consequently, a number of EU member states interviewed
warned of the reputational damage of being too close to the US at this particular
political moment, with the UK described as “having difficulty finding a middle point
between the US and Europe”. 63 The distinct lack of EU support has been connected
to growing concerns of declining UK influence in light of the UK’s decision to leave
the EU.64
Interviewees were cautious not to link the defeat directly to Brexit, highlighting
that “It's always been difficult for UK to win votes in the General Assembly on
decolonisation issues”. 65 However, the lack of EU solidarity was more directly
questioned in relation to the impact of the UK’s decision to leave the EU.66
Consequently, the case has potentially wider implications for the future of the
UK’s other ongoing territorial disputes, such as the Falkland Islands, along with 
the broader challenge of maintaining EU cooperation in the General Assembly,
particularly if European solidarity does decline in the years following the UK’s exit. 
It is however important to note that the UK ordered the permanent deportation of
the Chagossian people from the Islands in 1973 and that the overall treatment of the
Chagossians by the UK, represented a violation of basic human rights and a racist
policy of forced displacement. Their treatment following this displacement further
underlines the extent of the cruel and inhumane decisions made by the UK.67
Consequently the UK’s lost vote on the Chagos Islands must not be viewed purely
as a measure of global influence, but also in relation to the substantive issues
arising over these previous violations of rights. The UK should also consider the
further reputational damage caused by its decision to continue fighting against the
return of Chagossians to their homeland.
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“While these early indicators cannot tell us what
the UK’s position will be after Brexit, they do
indicate that the UK has been distracted by the
referendum result and can be interpreted as early
signs of decreased influence.”
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Election to the International Court of Justice 
In November 2017 the UK failed in its campaign to get British judge Sir Christopher
Greenwood re-elected to the ICJ. This was the first time the UK has not had a judge
in the ICJ in its 71-year history. Having been unsuccessful in the first round of voting,
the UK was forced to run off against India for the seat, ultimately failing to gain a
majority of votes in the General Assembly, despite support from the Security Council.
The British Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee reported that it was 
“a failure of UK diplomacy in an area of traditional UK strength” and that the vote
might “be an indication that the influence of the UK within the UN is at risk”. 68
Whilst the decision reflects a growing shift in the balance of power at the UN, away
from the dominance of the Security Council permanent members, it is notable that
France was able to successfully re-elect its judge in the first round of voting with
relative ease. Even more concerning for the UK was the fact that the same French
candidate for the ICJ came second to Sir Christopher Greenwood in the 2008 vote,
evidencing a decline in overall UK support and international standing. While
interviewees were clear that this could not be attributed entirely to Brexit, it was
linked to decreased British influence and described by Sir Jeremy Greenstock as a
vote the UK “shouldn’t have lost”. 69 Certainly, there is evidence to suggest that the
UK did not campaign as hard on this vote and was potentially distracted by other
concerns. Interviewees highlighted that the British Permanent Representative was not
in New York campaigning on the day of the vote. This was viewed as a noteworthy
diplomatic blunder.70 This was contrasted with the effectiveness of the French
Permanent Representative who was actively coordinating with member states to try
and secure promises of support in the final hours before the first vote. 
The direct significance of the UK’s decision
to leave the EU is notably varied across
each of the three cases outlined. In relation
to the Somalia case, it is clear that the UK’s
decision on Brexit exacerbates the already
difficult task of securing funding to support
the peace operations mandated by UK
leadership at the Security Council. Further
evidence of shifting EU priorities came in
July 2018 when it was announced that the
EU’s naval counter-piracy operation
headquarters currently based in the UK,
would be moved to Spain, along with the
relocation of the Maritime Security Centre
Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) to France.71
The restriction of the UK to third-party
involvement in EU Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP) missions is likely 
to significantly reduce the UK’s current
influence in the region.72
In contrast, the loss of the Chagos islands
vote was not a direct result of Brexit, even
if EU member states had sided with the UK
this would not have swung the vote
decisively in the UK’s favour. However, the
case does raise questions regarding the
potential longer-term impact for the UK if 
it were to lose the benefits of European
solidarity in the General Assembly.
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However, it should be noted that previous
literature on EU voting in the General
Assembly has highlighted that votes on
decolonisation generate much greater
disagreement amongst EU members.73
It is important to also note that the UK and
France have tended to converge on such
issues in contrast to other EU members,
which was not the case in this example.74
The UK’s loss in the ICJ election suggests
an element of foreign policy distraction.
However, the role of Brexit must be
viewed in connection to a range of other
factors which influenced both voting
patterns and the overall strategy of the
UK. Whilst the UK was very unlikely to
have beaten the Indian candidate in the
second vote runoff in the General
Assembly, its loss to the French candidate
in the first round did highlight the
contrasting efforts and focus of the two
countries in prioritising the election. Brexit
reinforces the importance of the UK not
taking for granted its relationships with
key allies in the General Assembly and 
the UN system more broadly, particularly
during a period of growing push back
against the influence of permanent
members in the UN.
The case studies compared
Conclusion
New York might seem insulated from the
high-drama of the Westminster-Brussels
relationship, but Brexit will have an impact
on the UK’s standing at the United Nations.
British diplomats will perform strongly but
they will lose political capital because they
are less able to align their campaigns in the
Security Council and the General Assembly
with the influence of their colleagues in
Brussels. As Sir John Sawers has
explained, Brexit means “the UK would
suffer “a double loss” at the UN since it
would not be able to shape the influential
common EU policy in New York or be able
to rely on EU support at the General
Assembly.”75
Nevertheless, the respect felt by a wide
array of stakeholders for the UK’s staff in
New York is undiminished by Brexit. UK
diplomats are described as “top of the
league”.76 And while this report has
focused on the challenges posed by Brexit,
it should be noted that UK diplomacy at the
Security Council has had successes since
Brexit, especially with respect to
diplomatically isolating Russia following a
chemical weapons attack inside the UK. 
But the UK must not draw the wrong
lessons from these successes. The UK has
invested resources in, and to a certain
extent is more comfortable dealing with,
the ‘high politics’ of great power relations
within the Security Council. Measures of
esteem for the UK within New York
reinforce this and, more to the point, the
UK has been less dependent on the EU in
this area. In contrast, the case studies we
have considered – resourcing peace
operations mandated by UK penholding and
securing support in the General Assembly –
are areas where the UK is exposed because
here its burden as a permanent member
has been reduced by its membership of the
EU. It is for this reason that experts like Ian
Martin, former director of think-tank
Security Council Report and former Special
Representative to the Secretary-General,
concludes that “the decline in UK influence
[in New York] is palpable. It’s partly Brexit,
but not only.”77
While the UK’s permanent seat on the
Security Council is safe in the sense that it
would need to consent to its own removal,
our conclusion is that Brexit exacerbates
concerns about the legitimacy of that
privilege. The status of the UK at the UN,
and particularly the legitimacy of the UK’s
position as a permanent member of the
Security Council, will therefore be
weakened if the impact of Brexit is not
offset by effective ‘compensatory
strategies’,78 such as those recommended
in our Executive Summary. 
Below: A British contingent of
UN Peacekeepers to the UN
Mission in South Sudan
(UNMISS) mark the
establishment of a field hospital
in Bentiu in 2017. (UN Photo)
Right: Prime Minister Clement
Attlee addresses the first
session of the UN General
Assembly in London in 1946.
(UN Photo)
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